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United States-Soviet Commercial Arbitration
Under the 1972 Trade Agreement
W ITHIN THE NEAR FUTURE United States-Soviet commercial
relations can be expected to expand substantially the 1972
U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement calling for bilateral trade to increase
three-fold over its 1969-71 level during the three-year period con-
templated by the Agreement.1 Because the respective economic sys-
tems of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics are so different, making it necessary for American private firms
to deal with the Russian state-trading entities, these relations are
obviously going to present novel and complex problems to both
sides. One very critical problem is that of the resolution of the com-
mercial disputes which will invariably arise in the course of U.S.-
Soviet trade. The governments of both nations have encouraged the
resolution of these disputes through the arbitration process.
Both governments have specifically encouraged arbitration to
take place under the Arbitration Rules of the Economic Commis-
sion for Europe of January 20, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as
E.C.E. Rules), calling for the appointing authority to be located in a
nation other than the U.S. or U.S.S.R., and the place of arbitration
to be in a nation other than the U.S. or U.S.S.R., which is a party
to the 1958 Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards.2 The 1972 Trade Agreement also provides,
however, that trade partners may agree to any other form of arbitra-
tion that they see fit. Because the Soviets have always sought to
domesticate foreign trade disputes in their Foreign Trade Arbitra-
tion Commission (hereinafter referred to as F.T.A.C.), it is likely
that arbitration not under the E.C.E. Rules would come before the
F.T.A.C. This note will describe and compare the basic features of
arbitration under both the E.C.E. Rules and the F.T.A.C. Rules from
the standpoint of which set of rules is more advantageous to the
U.S. investor.
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE FRAMEWORK
Since the U.S.S.R. is a socialist state there is no private enter-
prise and foreign trade, being no exception, is planned and admin-
1 1972 U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement Art. 2, 5 1 (Hereinafter cited as 1972 Trade
Agreement). Text of 1972 Trade Agreement taken from U.S. DEPT. OF COM-
MERCE, U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 1972 (1972).
2 1d. Art. 7,5 1.
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istered by the State. The level of foreign trade is determined by the
officials responsible for formulating the national economic plan.
This plan requires the importation of certain goods and materials
from abroad and the exportation of Soviet goods and materials in
order to earn the foreign currency necessary to finance these pur-
chases. The administration of foreign trade is in the hands of three
major divisions of the Soviet foreign trade framework: the Ministry
of Foreign Trade, the Foreign Trade Organizations (hereinafter re-
ferred to as F.T.O.'s) and the All-Union Chamber of Commerce.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade is under the immediate control
of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, the executive and administra-
tive authority of the U.S.S.R. according to the 1936 Constitution.
Its major function is to plan and administer foreign trade within
the framework of the national economic plan. To carry out this
function the Ministry of Foreign Trade has the authority to draft
and enter into trade agreements with other nations, to issue import
and export licenses, and to work out and administer tariff policies.'
The Ministry of Foreign Trade also is charged with directing and
controlling the establishment of the F.T.O.'s and with controlling
the Foreign Trade Delegations. The Foreign Trade Delegations,
part of the Soviet diplomatic mission and the beneficiaries of sover-
eign immunity, traditionally have appeared on the foreign market
as representatives of the Soviet State. These Delegations had the
power to conclude foreign trade contracts with private firms on be-
half of Soviet F.T.O.'s.4 However, under the 1972 Trade Agree-
ment their role is restricted to more that of a diplomatic trade repre-
sentative, since they are forbidden to "participate directly in the
negotiation, execution, or fulfillment of trade transactions or other-
wise carry on trade.'' 5
The actual trade contracts of U.S. firms will be concluded with
representatives of the Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations. The
F.T.O.'s are the legal entities in the U.S.S.R. which are, so to speak,
in the foreign trade business. Not an arm of the State, F.T.O.'s are
separate juridical persons, which can acquire rights in property in
their own names, incur obligations, sue and be sued. Most impor-
tant, the F.T.O.'s are economically accountable for their liabilities
5 1972 Trade Agreement Art. 5, Par. 3.
The Soviet American Example, 24 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 482, 486 (1959)
(hereinafter cited as Berman).
4Id.
5 1972 Trade Agreement Art. 5 Par. 3.
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out of their own assets, the State not being answerable for the debt
of an F.T.O. and vice versa. Each F.T.O. has a monopoly on for-
eign trade transactions in a particular sphere of the economy con-
trolling such areas as petroleum, agricultural products, etc.' The
charters of the F.T.O.'s, which list the type of operations and mer-
chandise the F.T.O. deals with, are published in the monthly journal
of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Vneshnaia Torgovla (Foreign
Trade), in both the Russian and English languages.7  Due to legis-
lative changes in the most recent Soviet Civil Code, foreign firms
may negotiate, insofar as foreign trade transactions and related mat-
ters are concerned, directly with the F.T.O.'s without special permis-
sion from the Ministry of Foreign Trade.'
Briefly, the operations of a Soviet F.T.O. are as follows. In the
case of imports, an F.T.O. will, on the basis of the plan, request
from the appropriate ministry the specifications of the particular
products which the organization is authorized by plan to purchase
abroad. Having received an import permit from the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, the F.T.O. goes onto the foreign market and con-
cludes a contract with a foreign supplier. Usually it is only after
this contract is concluded that the F.T.O. contracts with the domes-
tic customer, an enterprise under the control of the requesting min-
istry. The domestic enterprise pays for the goods at a rate which
includes the cost of transportation as well as a commission for the
F.T.O.9 In the case of exports, on the basis of the export plan, an
F.T.O. presents to an appropriate ministry an order which obligates
the ministry to deliver. The order is then submitted by the minis-
try to a subordinate enterprise along with an export permit. Either
before or after the domestic order is placed, the F.T.O. goes onto the
foreign market and concludes a contract with a foreign purchaser.
After the goods are delivered, the domestic supplier is paid at the
domestic wholesale rate. The F.T.O. receives a commission and de-
posits the rest of the money in the State treasury.1
The third division of the foreign trade framework is the All-
Union Chamber of Commerce. Like the F.T.O.'s, the Chamber of
Commerce is a juridical person with the right to acquire, sell and
0 Berman, supra note 3, at 987-88.
7 L. KOS-RABCEWICZ-ZUBKOWSKI, EAST EUROPEAN RULES ON THE
VALIDITY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 8 (1970).
8 Ramzaitsev, The Law of International Trade in the New Soviet Legislation, 1963
J. BUS. L. 229, 233.
9 Berman supra note 3, at 497-98.
10 Id. at 4 98.
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lease property, to enter into transactions within the limits set by its
charter, and to sue and be sued in court. Its functions are similar
to those of many Western chambers of commerce, to establish links
with economic organizations abroad. It participates in internation-
al congresses of chambers of commerce, the reception of foreign
trade and industrial delegations, the sending of similar organiza-
tions abroad, and the organization of foreign and domestic trade
and industrial fairs within the U.S.S.R. and abroad. Probably its
most important function for the purposes of the 1972 Trade Agree-
ment is that of operating the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commis-
sion.
The All-Union Chamber of Commerce is a social organization,
supposedly not subordinate to any State organ, although the Min-
istry of Foreign Trade does supervise the work of the Chamber of
Commerce. As a social organization, membership is voluntary and
members participate to a high degree in the administration of their
own affairs. While the Chamber of Commerce is technically not
part of the State foreign trade apparatus, it has been pointed out
that:
The fact that the All-Union Chamber of Commerce - at least to
the extent that it participates in activities connected with foreign
trade - helps to exercise the state foreign trade monopoly, and that
its members are often officials of state organizations, raises the ques-
tion whether the arbitration commissions which are attached to it,
and whose panels are appointed by its presidium, are sufficiently in-
dependent of the Soviet foreign trade combines to be considered
impartial in cases of disputes between them and foreign firms."
FOREIGN TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION - BACKGROUND
Arbitration tribunals play a vital role in the resolution of all
types of commercial disputes and the value of the arbitration pro-
cess is perhaps more appreciated in the U.S.S.R. than in any other
nation. Commercial disputes between domestic enterprises are not
resolved in the courts, but rather are heard in Gosarbitrazh, the
State arbitration tribunals. Soviet recognition of the special ad-
vantages of arbitration carried over into the field of foreign trade
transactions when, on June 17, 1932, a resolution of the Central
Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars (now
Council of Ministers) of the U.S.S.R. established the Foreign Trade
Arbitration Commission. Located in Moscow, the F.T.A.C. is oper-
ated by the All-Union Chamber of Commerce, whose Presidium
appoints the fifteen arbitrators who make up the F.T.A.C. and
11 Id. at 493.
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which, by the decision of its Presidium of January 21, 1949, formu-
lated the F.T.A.C. Rules of Procedure governing the hearing of
disputes. Section one of the F.T.A.C. Rules 2 indicates that the
tribunal is to hear disputes "of every nature arising from foreign
trade contracts and, in particular, disputes between foreign firms
and Soviet trading organizations."
The structure of the F.T.A.C., particularly the fact that it is
operated by the All-Union Chamber of Commerce, presents many
questions as to the extent that impartiality can be expected in
F.T.A.C. decisions. This is so because all of the institutions mak-
ing up the Soviet foreign trade apparatus intertwine to insure their
subordination to the State. While the Presidium of the Chamber
of Commerce appoints the arbitrators who make up the F.T.A.C.,
the Chamber of Commerce itself is under the supervision of the
Ministry of Foreign Trade, an arm of the government. The Min-
istry of Foreign Trade is responsible for appointing the heads of
the F.T.O.'s, the same entities which would appear before the
F.T.A.C. as the party opposing the U.S. investor. This state of af-
fairs results in a great potential for abuse in the form of coercion
of the arbitrators. The fact that the F.T.A.C. is potentially subject
to State control makes it different from Western arbitration tribu-
nals, such as the American Arbitration Association, which are essen-
tially private in nature. This drawback to F.T.A.C. arbitrations has
caused one observer to wonder "if they are not in essence national
courts for foreign causes functioning under the color of interna-
tional arbitration.' '13
Although theoretically F.T.A.C. arbitration is subject to abuse,
based on the limited information available concerning actual cases
heard by the F.T.A.C., justice can be obtained by the Western party.
A compilation of thirty-three cases, twenty-three of which involved
Western parties, heard by the F.T.A.C. between 1951 and 1958, in-
dicates that the Soviet tribunal does not show any blatant bias to-
ward non-Soviets.' 4 It should also be remembered that the Soviets
12 The translation of the F.T.A.C. Rules used in this note is that found in Lerner,
East-West Trade: The U.S.S.R. Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, 170 N.Y.L.J. 1
(Sept. 12, 1973).
13 Pisar, The Communist System of Foreign Trade Adjudication, 72 HARV. L. REV.
1409, 1462-63 (1959).
14 Based on a summary compiled by Richard Lerner of A. SHPECTOROV, COL-
LECTED ARBITRATION CASES PART II (June 25, 1973). See Left, The Foreign
Trade Arbitration Commission of the U.S.S.R. and the West in NEW STRATEGIES
FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 172-
173 (1971); Pisar, Treatment of Communist Foreign Trade Arbitration In Western
1974]
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seek to attract as much litigation as possible to the F.T.A.C. and that
they cannot accomplish this objective unless the F.T.A.C. establishes
a reputation for impartiality. In view of this goal, it has been sug-
gested that current publication in the West of F.T.A.C. decisions
without editorial omission "might do much to allay the suspicion
with which Soviet requests for reception of her arbitration system
have been received."' 5
ARBITRATION RULES OF THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION
FOR EUROPE - BACKGROUND
Very little has been written about arbitration under the Econom-
ic Commission for Europe Rules because, until the conclusion of the
1972 Trade Agreement, they were very unimportant. In fact, it is
believed that before the 1972 Trade Agreement, no arbitration had
ever been organized under the E.C.E. Rules.'6 Even now most
parties involved in the negotiation of contracts under the 1972
Trade Agreement have opted for ad hoc arbitration in Stockholm,
calling for the President of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
to act as appointing agent should the parties fail to agree upon the
third or neutral arbitrator."7 Nevertheless, the importance of the
E.C.E. Rules cannot be ignored and as more attorneys in the U.S.
become familiar with them, their importance will increase. The
recent action of the American Bar Association's International Law
Section, urging the adoption of a uniform set of international rules
of procedure to supplement the E.C.E. Rules for the resolution of
commercial disputes growing out of East-West Trade, cannot help
but contribute to their use.18
The Economic Commission for Europe was established by the
Economic and Social Council of the U.N. in March, 1947, as a
regional body to promote cooperation among its members leading
to the eventual economic integration of Europe.'" Membership in
Courts in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 107, n. 16 (M. Domke ed.
1958); But see Hazard, State Trading and Arbitration in INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ARBITRATION 94-96 (M. Domke ed. 1958).
15 Hazard, supra note 14, at 100.
16 Starr, Settlement of East-West Trade Disputes, COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL
(The Journal of the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1973).
17 Straus, Interim Observations on Arbitration Arrangements in Soviet-American
Trade, 28 ARB. J. 105, 106 (1973).
18 Resolution of the Section of International Law of the American Bar Association
(December 8, 1973).




the E.C.E. is confined to European members of the U.N. and the
U.S., although non-member nations of Europe can participate in a
consultative but nonvoting capacity.20 Previous efforts in the field
of commercial arbitration by the E.C.E. included the 1961 European
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. In 1966 a
group of E.C.E. experts prepared the Arbitration Rules of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe of January 20, 1966 (E.C.E. Rules)
with their use in disputes arising out of East-West Trade as their
ostensible purpose.
The key feature of the E.C.E. Rules is the appointing authority,
which makes them particularly suited for resolving disputes growing
out of East-West Trade between parties of different economic sys-
tems. The appointing authority is called upon to resolve problems
which have traditionally been stumbling blocks to the functioning
of the arbitration process, such as the appointment of arbitrators,
the replacement of arbitrators, and determination of the place of
arbitration. Arbitration under the E.C.E. Rules calls for the naming
of a national appointing authority2 and an international appointing
authority, named by both parties to a commercial contract to func-
tion in disputes arising out of that contract.22 The model arbitra-
tion clause provided in the Rules recommends that both the ap-
pointing authority and the place of arbitration be spelled out in
the arbitration agreement.
If an appointing authority is not named in the arbitration agree-
ment, Article Four of the Rules indicates that the appointing author-
ity of the place of arbitration is to serve as appointing authority for
the dispute. 3 If neither an appointing authority nor a place of
arbitration has been designated in the arbitration agreement, Article
20D. WIGHTMAN, ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE 56-57 (1956).
21 The Annex to the E.C.E. Rules lists institutions in member countries of the E.C..E
which may be required to act as appointing authorities. The All-Union Chamber of
Commerce is listed as appointing authority in the U.S.S.R. There is as yet no national
appointing authority within the U.S. In the opinion of Gerald Aksen, General Counsel
of the American Arbitration Association, expressed in a letter to this writer on February
11, 1974, the reason for this is that it was not originally anticipated that E.C.E. arbitra-
tions would be held in the U.S. and the 1972 Trade Agreement calls for U.S.-Soviet arbi-
trations to be held in a neutral third country.
22 It is likely that the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce will be designated as inter-
national appointing authority in contracts concluded between U.S. and Soviet trading part-
ners. Previous contracts under the 1972 Trade Agreement have provided for ad hoc
arbitration in Stockholm, naming the President of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
as appointing agent if the parties fail to agree upon a third or neutral arbitrator. Supra
note 17.
23 ARBITRATION RULES OF U.N.E.C.E., E/ECE/625/Rev. 1; E/ECE/TRADE/
8 1/Rev. 1 (1970) (hereinafter cited as E.C.E. Rules).
1974]
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Five indicates that the claimant has three options. First, he may
choose as an international appointing authority the national appoint-
ing authority of the country in which the respondent has his habitual
residence or seat. A second option for the claimant is the Special
Committee set up under Article IV of the European Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration of April 21, 1961. The Spe-
cial Committee consists of three members, a chairman and two ordi-
nary members. The Chambers of Commerce or other designated
organs of the capitalist Western European nations, party to the
1961 Convention, elect one ordinary member who serves for four
years, and a chairman. The Chambers of Commerce or other desig-
nated organizations of the socialist Eastern European members, party
to the Convention, do the same. The respective chairmen elected
by the two groups serve alternately for two years each.24 Since the
committee was established with the problem of East-West disputes
in mind, it could prove to be useful under the Rules in the selection
of the appointing authority, even though the U.S. is not a party to
the 1961 Convention. The third option calls for the appointing
authority to be appointed by the Court of Arbitration of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce if the parties have their habitual
residence or seat in countries in which a National Committee of
the I.C.C. exists. Since the U.S.S.R. does not have such a National
Committee, this option is inapplicable to U.S.-Soviet arbitration.
The importance of the appointing authority cannot be underesti-
mated within the framework of U.S.-Soviet commercial relations.
Conceivably the fairness and integrity of the entire arbitration can
be in the hands of the appointing authority should the parties not
be able to agree upon an arbitrator or should their selected arbitra-
tors not agree upon an umpire. The fact that the appointing
authority can and will break such a deadlock insures that the parties
signing an arbitration agreement are manifesting their willingness to
lose the dispute, a factor which is essential to the arbitration pro-
cess. Because the appointing authority can compel arbitration, the
realization by each party that the arbitration will result in an award,
no matter what they do, should be a force in influencing each party
to act justly and in good faith in carrying out the arbitration pro-
cedures. Each hopes that, if nothing else, his fellow disputant
will also act in such a manner, The appointing authority is the
type of feature, especially if U.S. and Soviet disputants can come up
24 Benjamin, The European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
11961] BRITISH YBK. of INT'L L. 478, 485.
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with a consistently reliable appointing authority such as the Stock-
holm .Chamber of Commerce, that can be profitably studied for pos-
sible application to non-commercial arbitration between the govern-
ments of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
JURISDICTION
F.T.A.C.
The F.T.A.C. has jurisdiction to hear only those disputes to
which both parties have consented in writing. Additionally, the
subject matter jurisdiction is limited to disputes arising out of for-
eign trade contracts in F.T.A.C. Rules Section 1. Written consent
may be conferred in three ways: most often, by an arbitration clause
in the sales contract; by a special written agreement between the
parties subsequent to the sales contract; finally, although not ap-
plicable in the case of trade under the 1972 Trade agreement, by
an arbitration clause in a treaty regulating trade between the U.S.S.R.
and some other country.25 The question of whether the F.T.A.C.
has jurisdiction is decided by the arbitrators themselves,26 but the
danger of a' grossly unfair assumption of jurisdiction is countered
by the fact that it can be resisted in the course of enforcement pro-
ceedings according to the provisions of the 1958 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
E.C.E.
For arbitration to take place under the E.C.E. Rules it is recom-
mended that it be so provided in an arbitration clause of a sales
agreement.2 A party intending to raise a plea against the arbitra-
tor's jurisdiction, because the arbitration agreement is improper in
some way, must do so at the time he submits his statement of claim
or defense regarding the substantive dispute. If the party's jurisdic-
tional objection is based on the arbitrators having exceeded their
terms of reference, it must be presented as soon as the issue over
which the arbitrators have no jurisdiction is raised.2" As under the
F.T.A.C. Rules, the arbitrators themselves decide the jurisdictional
25 Leff, supra note 14, at 153.
26 Ramzaitsev, The Law Applied by Arbitration Tribunals-I, from THE SOURCES
OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 140 (Schmitthoff ed. 1964).
27 E.C.E. Rules Art. 1.
281d. Art. 17.
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question. 9 While this decision also may be challenged during en-
forcement proceedings, it should be noted that a U.S. court would
seemingly be more reluctant to invalidate an E.C.E. arbitration in a
neutral country, than one before the F.T.A.C.
SELECTION OF ARBITRATORS
F.T.A.C.
The F.T.A.C. is composed of fifteen arbitrators appointed for
one year by the Presidium of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce
from representatives of trading, industrial, transport and similar
organizations and also from persons having special knowledge of
foreign trade. When the claimant submits the Points of Claim,
he either selects a member of the F.T.A.C. as his arbitrator or asks
that the choice be left to the President of the F.T.A.C. The Presi-
dent then forwards the Points of Claim to the respondent who
within fifteen days of its receipt must either choose his arbitrator
from members of the F.T.A.C. or leave it to the President of the
F.T.A.C. - unless the parties have agreed upon a longer time peri-
od. If the respondent does not choose an arbitrator within fifteen
days the President of the F.T.A.C. makes the selection. Once the
respondent's arbitrator has been chosen or appointed, the arbitrators
have fifteen days after notice of his selection to choose an Umpire.
If they cannot agree upon one, the President of the F.T.A.C. makes
the appointment. In exceptional cases, if both parties consent, the
case can be settled by a sole umpire chosen by the parties or by the
President of the F.T.A.C. if they desire.
Obviously, the most unattractive aspect of these procedures to
the U.S. investor is the fact that all of the arbitrators are Soviets.
As a result, it is unlikely that a U.S. investor would be at all famil-
iar with any of the arbitrators and practice has shown that most
foreign investors waive their right of selection to the President of
the F.T.A.C.3° In addition to his unfamiliarity with the arbitrators,
a U.S. investor faces the possibility of both nationalistic and socialis-
tic bias. F.T.A.C. arbitrators, although eminent specialists in various
fields, are usually Party members, or at the very least committed to
Communism.3 While it has been argued that the all-Soviet make-
29 Id. Art. 18.
30 Pisar, The Communist System of Foreign Trade Adjudication, 72 HARV. L. REV.
1409, 1422 (1959).
81 Id. at 1423.
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up of the F.T.A.C. is not discriminatory per se,"2 the distinguished
scholar of Soviet law, John Hazard, has observed:
* . . the world has come to know the measure of loyalty expected
of all Soviet citizens regardless of whether they are directly em-
ployed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and this knowledge has
led many private merchants outside the U.S.S.R. to doubt that even
the best informed expert can dissociate himself from the view of the
Soviet party to any dispute before the arbitration commissions. 33
Even assuming that the Soviet arbitrators are free of any conscious
bias, they, like all other individuals, are products of their environ-
ment and it is very probable that unconscious bias toward the claims
of a U.S. businessman, perhaps toward his desire to make a large
profit, could exist and influence the decison of the arbitrator.
E.C.E.
Under the E.C.E. Rules the claimant gives notice to the respon-
dent of the dispute by a registered letter which makes reference to
the arbitration agreement. In this letter the claimant calls upon the
respondent to reach agreement with him regarding an arbitrator or
arbitrators. The claimant proposes: appointment of a sole arbitra-
tor; appointment of three arbitrators, each party appointing one
arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators choosing a presiding
arbitrator; or appointment of a specific arbitral institution in which
case settlement of the dispute is conducted under the rules of this
institution. Selection of three arbitrators is the rule and selection
of a sole arbitrator the exception.3 4  It is preferable for the parties
to agree beforehand, when the arbitration clause is adopted, whether
a sole arbitrator should be used or whether three will make the
award. It has been suggested that the decision be based on the
value of the claim, resorting to a sole arbitrator when it is below
a specified figure and otherwise using three arbitrators.35
After receipt of notice by the respondent, the parties have thirty
days in which to agree upon the selection of a sole arbitrator or an
arbitral institution and forty-five days in which to agree upon selec-
tion of arbitrators and a presiding arbitrator. If there is no agree-
ment in this time the claimant may apply to the appointing authority
32 Leff, supra note 14, at 174.
38 Hazard, supra note 14, at 94-95.
34 Benjamin, New Arbitration Rules for Use in International Trade, from INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION VOL. III 333 (Pieter Sanders ed. 1965).
85 Cohn, The Rules of Arbitration of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe, 16 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 946, 955 (1967).
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designated in the arbitration agreement or, if there is no appointing
authority designated in the agreement, to the appointing author-
ity of the place of arbitration if that is fixed in the agreement.
The appointing authority then, if the parties give their consent in
writing, appoints either a sole arbitrator or an arbitral institution
which will settle the dispute according to its own rules. If the par-
ties do not consent to either of these alternatives, the appointing
authority then invites each party to appoint an arbitrator and the
two arbitrators then appoint a presiding arbitrator. If one of the
parties fails to appoint an arbitrator within thirty days of the ap-
pointing authority's invitation, or if the two arbitrators can't agree
upon a presiding arbitrator within forty-five days of the invitation,
the appointing authority himself makes the appointment.
Thus, in the case of a three-man arbitration in which the parties
cannot agree, they have forty-five days to agree and then, after
what is, in effect, a warning by the appointing authority, a thirty to
forty-five day period of grace exists before the appointing authority
takes action. The two waiting periods, in addition to providing a
cooling-off period in which the parties may resolve their dispute
amicably, effectively minimize the compulsory nature of the proce-
dure. This is another technique of much value in East-West dis-
putes, with their accompanying suspicion and distrust and it insures
that although arbitration cannot be evaded, it will at least be im-




One problem with taking cases before the F.T.A.C. arises from
the application of Soviet conflict of law rules. They are marked by:
a general desire to ensure as wide an immunity from the applicabil-
ity of foreign law as a respectable degree of conformity to tradi-
tional choice of law rules will allow.36
Naturally, the unfamiliarity of the U.S. litigant with Soviet rules of
law puts him at a disadvantage in relation to his Soviet trading
partner with regard to both actions taken in performance of the
contract and the appearance before the F.T.A.C. An additional
pitfall is that the U.S. party may find himself bound by an absolute
36 Pisar, Soviet Conflict of Laws in International Commercial Transactions, 70 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 630 (1957).
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rule of Soviet law, even though the contract provided that some
other law was to govern.
The basic Soviet conflict's rule for foreign trade transactions is
found in Section 566 of the 1964 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) Civil Code which provides:
The rights and duties of parties under external trade transactions are
defined by the law of the place in which they were concluded, un-
less the parties otherwise provide by their agreement. Soviet law
decides in which place a transaction is [regarded as] effected.87
Under Soviet law the place where the contract is concluded is where
both parties signed or, if both parties are not present, the place
where the offeror receives his acceptance. 8
It would seem from this provision that the Soviets accept party
autonomy in choosing the applicable law to govern a contract, but
this conclusion is not warranted. To begin with, foreign law cannot
be applied in the U.S.S.R. if its application would contravene funda-
mental principles of Soviet law (R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CODE Sec.
568) ." Although no decision in the F.T.A.C. has applied this pro-
vision,4° because of its broad scope, its potential effect of negating
a choice of foreign law by the parties seems virtually unlimited.
Secondly, freedom in choice of law is also circumscribed in that if the
parties choose law which is unrelated to the transaction, this de-
cision will lose its effect due to the fraud provisions of the
R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code. The Code renders invalid those transactions
made for a purpose contrary to law, in fraud of law, or directed to
the prejudice of the state.4 Finally, it has been pointed out that
allowing party autonomy in choice of law, without interference by
the government:
far from being a renunciation of authority, . . .procures a consider-
able advantage for the state. On closer analysis, the adoption of this
time-honored principle of Western "bourgeois law" is found to fa-
vor the maximum expression of the public foreign trade monopoly's
tremendous bargaining power in its commercial dealings with indi-
vidual and generally less powerful foreign firms. 42
In short, party autonomy as to choice of law in the past has often
27 Translation of R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code in 2 KIRALFY, LAW IN EASTERN EUROPE
(1966).
38 LEFF, supra note 14, at 159.
3 R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CODE § 568 in 2 KIRALFY, supra note 37, at 150.
40 Ramzaitsev, supra note 26, at 150.
41 Pisar, supra note 37, at 632.
42 Pisar, supra note 31, at 1443.
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meant that a Soviet F.T.O. could dictate to its Western partner that
Soviet law would be used.
The application of Soviet law in disputes before the F.T.A.C.
is further enhanced because of certain absolute rules of Soviet law
which cannot be varied by agreement and which the F.T.A.C., as
a Soviet tribunal, is obligated to apply. One such rule is that the
validity of the arbitration agreement depends upon the observance
of the law of the country in which the arbitration is to be held.
This means that an agreement to arbitrate before the F.T.A.C.
must be proper under Soviet law, i.e., the F.T.A.C. is competent to
hear the dispute under Soviet law. A second absolute rule is that
the legal capacity of a juridical personality is determined by its
charter under the law of the nation in which it was created, no
matter where the contract was made. Consequently, the F.T.A.C.
will determine under Soviet law whether a particular F.T.O. had
the capacity to enter into a particular contract, even if it was made
in the U.S. The importance of this rule can be fully comprehended
only in connection with the discussion of the Soviet agency concept
of authority which follows.
Section 565 Par. 2 of the R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code provides that:
The form of external trade transactions effected by Soviet organi-
zation and the procedure for their signature are determined by the
legislation of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of the place where they were
effected.
This is also an absolute rule of Soviet law which governs a con-
tract with a Soviet F.T.O. notwithstanding the fact that the con-
tract is concluded in the U.S. or some third country. In addition
to precluding the formation of a valid contract by an oral agree-
ment, this provision effectively eliminates the concept of apparent
authority from Soviet law regarding foreign trade transactions.43
An oral agreement does not meet the form requirements of Soviet
law and would be ruled invalid by the F.T.A.C., even if the contract
was to be governed by U.S. law and was valid under U.S. law.
Similarly, a contract concluded with an unauthorized official of a
Soviet F.T.O., even if he possessed apparent authority under U.S.
jurisprudence, would be ruled invalid by the F.T.A.C.44
43 Under the concept of apparent authority an agent possessing no actual authority
may bind his principal to a contract if the contracting party, on the basis of some com-
munication from the principal, reasonably believes that the agent has actual authority to
bind his principal. See SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 22
(1st ed. 1964).
4 4 See KOS-RABCEWICZ-ZUBKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 4.
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Contracts with Soviet F.T.O.'s require two signatures, the signa-
ture of the president of the F.T.O. or his deputy and the signature
of the representative authorized to sign contracts under a written
power of attorney.4" The names of persons authorized to sign con-
tracts on behalf of the F.T.O.'s are published in the official journal
of the Foreign Trade Ministry, Vneshnaia Torgovla.46  A contract
signed by an improper representative would be void under Soviet
law both because its form was improper and because the so-called
representative didn't have the capacity and authority to bind the
F.T.O. This strange conflict's rule stems from the nature of the
Soviet economy as a single planned and integrated unit. Thus,
whatever affects an F.T.O. is thought of as also having an effect on
the national economy, and hence on the nation's sovereignty. As
one observer has explained:
the negligent or deliberately dishonest act of a Soviet foreign trade
corporation official could submit the Soviet economy to a significant
undesired obligation. It is to preclude such interference by its own
trade officials with its carefully drafted foreign trade plan that the
Soviet Union has established its conflict's rule.47
E.C.E.
The handling of choice of law under the E.C.E. Rules is more
advantageous to the U.S. disputant, since it is more flexible. Ac-
cording to Articles Thirty-eight and Thirty-nine, the resolution of
disputes shall be based on law as determined by the parties, unless
both parties agree to let the arbitrators act as 'amiables composi-
teurs', in which case the decision will be made according to equi-
table principles. If the parties cannot agree the arbitrators them-
selves will decide upon an applicable law. While this solution to
the choice of law problem is not very satisfactory, it has been pointed
out that a more specific rule could not have gained widespread con-
sent.48 The E.C.E. rule at least insures that the U.S. investor will
not be surprised by the application of an absolute rule of Soviet
law of which he was not aware.
The arbitrators are also directed by Article Thirty-eight to "take
account of the terms of the contract and trade usages" in making
this decision. This provision, too, leaves something to be desired
45 Hoya, The Legal Framework of Soviet Foreign Trade, 56 MINN. L. REV. 1, 32
(1971).
46 Id. at 33.
47 Id.
48 Cohn, supra note 36, at 973.
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because of its vagueness. The terms of a contract will many times
call for interpretation and methods- of interpretation which under
various legal systems may differ significantly. 49 Additionally, the
fact that the Soviets reject customary international law, unless they
have consented to the custom in some way, minimizes the application
of trade usage as a source of law."° The eventual solution to the
choice of law problem in arbitration under the E.C.E. Rules may lie
in the use of the "transnational law" clause, the application of gen-
erally recognized rules of law of the civilized nations."' In the case
of U.S.-Soviet arbitration, however, this type of clause is years away.
Much time will be required before commercial relations between




General F.T.A.C. arbitrations are based on documents, with the
parties appearing only for the examination of proofs and verifica-
tion procedure, and the giving of the award at a public session,
unless an in camera hearing is requested, during which the parties
may orally plead their case. While a party is entitled to plead his
own case, the F.T.A.C. Rules provide that he may also be represented
by an attorney. Foreign attorneys are authorized to plead cases and
the Soviet College of Advocates is also authorized to offer the ser-
vices of a Soviet attorney.5 2 The wisdom of a U.S. investor using
Soviet representation has been questioned due to the loyalty to the
interests of the Soviet state expected of attorneys.53
F.T.A.C. arbitrators may be challenged before the beginning of
the hearing if it appears that they may have an interest in the out-
come of the dispute. They have a free hand in verifying the evi-
dence and evaluating it in making an award. Decisions are made
by majority vote and the award rendered in writing, including the
reasons for the award. Generally, the winning party is awarded
the costs of conducting his case, not exceeding 5o of the award.
49 Id. at 974.
5 0 See RAMUNDO, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE BUILDING OF COMMUNISM 60-64 (1967).
51 Cohn, supra note 36, at 973.
52 LEFF, supra note 14, at 156.




The E.C.E. Rules provide that an arbitration may be conducted
solely by means of documentary evidence without an oral hearing,
but this appears to be the exception and not the rule. A party may
plead his own case or use a representative. The arbitrators are
given complete discretion in the admission and assessment of evi-
dence and also in the manner in which they conduct the hearing,
subject to the requirement that it be a fair hearing on the basis of
absolute equality. Arbitrators are subject to challenge if it appears
that they are interested in the outcome of the dispute. The Rules
also provide for the rendering of an award on the basis of an ex
parte hearing should a party fail to appear or fail to submit docu-
mentary evidence in the case of an arbitration based solely on docu-
mentary evidence. Costs generally are to be borne by the unsuccess-
ful party, but may be apportioned.
ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS
F.T.A.C.
The enforcement of F.T.A.C. judgments has received a great
boost from the recent U.S. accession to the 1958 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 54 since
the U.S.S.R. is also party to the Convention. Because there is no
appeal from an F.T.A.C. decision, the enforcement procedure in-
creases in importance. One real advantage to the U.S. investor's
making use of the F.T.A.C. is the fact that a ruling against the So-
viet party will not have to be judicially enforced, since the Soviet
party will invariably comply voluntarily. It has been explained
that:
a refusal on the part of state traders to abide voluntarily by a
decision of their national foreign trade tribunal is in fact inconceiv-
able since it would reflect not only on its reliability as a business
partner and on that of each branch of the monopoly of which it is a
part, but more directly it would destroy the effectiveness and pres-
tige of tribunals designed to inspire confidence abroad and to attract
a maximum volume of jurisdiction. 55
Another advantage to the U.S. investor is that under the 1958 U.N.
Convention a U.S. court may refuse to enforce an F.T.A.C. decision
on several grounds. Two of the more important grounds are first,
54 UN Doc. E/CONF. 26/9 Rev. 1 6/10 (1958) (hereinafter cited as 1958 U.N.
Convention).
55 Pisar, supra note 31, at 1468-1469.
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that the U.S. party was given neither proper notice nor an oppor-
tunity to present his case, and second, that enforcement of the deci-
sion would violate the public policy of the U.S." The typical
American court would be much more likely to be alert to an unfair
decision and countenance its nonenforcement when the tribunal ren-
dering that decision is the F.T.A.C.
E.C.E.
Enforcement of arbitral decisions under the E.C.E. Rules also
has the advantage of the 1958 U.N. Convention since the 1972
Trade Agreement provides that the place of arbitration should be a
third country, other than the U.S. or U.S.S.R., which is party to the
Convention. The award is not subject to appeal unless the law of
the nation in which the award is made is contrary to this rule. 7
However, since the Rules permit an award to be rendered in a
country other than the one in which the arbitration took place, a
law contrary to the spirit of Article 42 can be circumvented."' Con-
sequently, in the case of the E.C.E. Rules enforcement proceedings
are of special importance to the U.S. investor as the only opportunity
to appeal an E.C.E. award. While the aforementioned grounds of
resisting an arbitral award provided by the 1958 U.N. Convention
are available, it is unlikely that an American court would overturn
a neutral third-country arbitral award as readily as it would an
F.T.A.C. award.
CONCLUSION
The choice made in the 1972 Trade Agreement to encourage
the use of arbitration to resolve commercial disputes was a wise one.
Neither U.S. nor Soviet participants in international transactions rel-
ish the thought of litigating disputes in the courts of their trade
partner. The delays alone are intolerable but particularly trouble-
some is the mutual unfamiliarity with the rules of law and procedure
of the respective judicial systems. In addition to being swift, the
arbitration process is familiar to the Soviets, who make use of it
domestically and to the U.S. business community, where its use has
been increasingly on the rise in recent years. Neither U.S. nor So-
viet traders feel secure about the objectivity of the local judiciary,
56 1958 U.C. Convention Art. 5, 55 1 and 2.
57 E.C.E. Rules Art. 42.
58 Cohn, supra note 36, at 971.
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but the arbitration process, allowing for the selection of interna-
tional trade experts as arbitrators, gives greater assurance of a more
objective and international outlook in settling commercial disputes.
Since the development of trade is yet in an early stage, there is
little data upon which to evaluate the operation of the arbitration
process in U.S.-Soviet trade. The main obstacle to its successful
employment would be the failure to establish an appointing author-
ity acceptable to U.S. and Soviet traders. The ultimate goal of the
facilitation of the arbitration process would be to find a consistently
reliable appointing authority, such as the President of the Stock-
holm Chamber of Commerce. The psychological importance of es-
tablishing a neutral forum for the airing of U.S.-Soviet disputes
should not be underestimated. Although at first only commercial
disputes would be subject to resolution by arbitration, mutual U.S.-
Soviet confidence in the neutrality of a forum might ultimately
lead to the resolution of political differences in the same fashion.
J. ALEX MORTON
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